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ABSTRACT  This paper approaches the 2010-2014 economic crisis in Greece from the 
perspective of loss and mourning, critically exploring what questions and insights this 
provokes. We argue first that the rhetoric of mainstream political and media elites has been 
instrumental in framing responses to the Greek economic crisis in patriotic terms, a frame 
subsequently adopted by groups from across the entire political spectrum, whether part of the 
establishment or not. We then draw on discourse theory and psychoanalysis to argue that 
attachments to the dominant austerity and anti-austerity responses to the crisis can be 
understood – at least in part – in terms of a failure (or not) to properly articulate and thus 
mourn the nationalist-inflected loss associated with economic dislocation. We sketch out two 
ideological pathways in the discourses of austerity and anti-austerity, which we designate as 
symptomatic of ‘blocked mourning’: a melancholic pathway that seeks to contain loss 
through self-blame; and a pathway of ressentiment that seeks to contain loss by attributing its 
cause to a series of ‘others’. We argue that blocked mourning bears a direct relation to the 
ideological grip of the austerity and anti-austerity discourses, and that we can better 
appreciate the character and strength of their affective pull by drawing out the fantasmatic 
aspects of the narratives expressing Greek national and economic identity. Conversely, we 
argue that a critique of ideology can be understood in terms of the preconditions for 
mourning, whose satisfaction would make possible a less invested relation to the fantasmatic 
guarantees underpinning the austerity/anti-austerity narratives. In this view, a critique of 
ideology proceeds by bringing to light those factors that could facilitate a more open and 





It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental 
historical events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of 
certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the 




The economic crisis in Greece brought about a crisis of representation from 2010 
onwards very similar to what Antonio Gramsci had in mind when he talked about a ‘crisis 
of authority’.3 The economic crisis became the context of unprecedented social unrest and 
political instability, and of the redrawing of political frontiers.4 Out went a three decades-
long PASOK-ND bipartisan system. In came a more fractured political regime of 
representation, culminating in the 2015 electoral successes of SYRIZA, previously a 
minor left-wing coalition party. The crisis resulted in a simplification of the political 
space around an austerity/anti-austerity cleavage, commonly appearing in the form of a 
memorandum/anti-memorandum opposition.5 Some scholars have shown how the 
dynamics of the anti-austerity protests helped construct this cleavage,6 while others have 
drawn attention to the crucial role played in this process by populist logics.7 
 
What is notable in these developments is how an oversimplified and powerful 
austerity/anti-austerity opposition has come to overshadow the public debate on political 
economy, including more complex and nuanced accounts of the causes of the crisis, as 
well as potential alternative social and economic visions for the future.8 This paper 
contributes to our understanding of how this polarisation and instability of Greek political 
discourse came about and how it was sustained. In line with recent literature that 
foregrounds the role rhetoric and nationalist narratives play in such an account,9 we show 
how references to patriotism and the nation, as well as references to themes from ancient 
and recent Greek history, emerged very quickly as key coordinates framing the crisis and 
its public perception. Much literature has focused on the nationalist tenor of left-wing and 
far right anti-austerity responses to the measures affirmed by successive pro-
memorandum governments,10 but in this article we show that the patriotic/nationalist 
framing was already present in the discourse of the ‘centre’ – the mainstream 
governments and press – eventually spreading to encompass virtually the entire Greek 
political-discursive landscape, the left SYRIZA party inclusive. 
 
We elucidate in particular the force of the competing patriotic justifications of austerity and 
anti-austerity, offering a deeper understanding of the polarised and unstable character of 
Greek political discourse, and of the narrowing of the political economy debate. This 
nationalist narrative context furnishes the background against which we identify ‘loss’ as a 
promising interpretive frame within which to organize popular interpretations and affective 
investments. Whether expressed explicitly or implicitly, the presence and prominence of loss 
provides some rationale for turning to psychoanalytic categories in critically explaining the 
way the public discourse of the crisis developed from 2010 onwards. The category of 
mourning, in particular, is central to our account because we discern two main modes of 
attachment to the nationalist narratives with which austerity and anti-austerity have been 
articulated. In this view, these two modes – what we call melancholia and ressentiment – can 
be understood in terms of a failure to process loss properly, in other words, a failure to 
mourn. 
 
What is interesting about this failure to process loss properly is not simply that it can be 
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glossed as a case of ‘blocked mourning’; it also bears a direct relation to the ideological grip 
of such discourses. We argue that we can better appreciate the character and strength of this 
ideological grip by drawing out the fantasmatic aspects of the narratives animating Greek 
national identity, and by showing how these features tell us something about the loss at stake. 
Conversely, we argue that a critique of ideology can be understood in terms of the category 
of, and conditions for, mourning. Mourning entails meeting fundamental, fantasmatic self-
images with the judgement that they are no longer, thereby opening up a new pathway 
toward a future yet to be decided and only guaranteed through collective judgement. We use 
this framework to argue that elite political discourse and practice has served to reinforce 
popular attachment to Greek nationalist fantasies that lend ideological support to austerity 
and anti-austerity measures, and in this way they contributed decisively to the production of a 
highly polarised and volatile political order. As a result, the discursive conditions for 
mourning the loss wrought by economic dislocation were not satisfied, making alternative 
visions of Greek national and economic life harder to discern and promote. 
 
 
Discourse theory and psychoanalysis 
We develop a distinctive approach to the analysis of the Greek crisis drawing on political 
discourse theory and psychoanalysis.11 We draw attention here to two importrant features of 
such an approach: the  practice of articulation; and the role psychoanalytic concepts can play, 
in particular fantasy and mourning. The practice of articulation simply foregrounds the non-
necessary character of the relation between elements, for example, between economy and 
nation. This captures the way such terms link up with one another through concrete practices 
of ‘articulation’ that depend on a complex mix of context and intention which is hard to 
predict or anticipate. Consider, as an example, how the pro-austerity/anti-austerity opposition 
is often used interchangeably with the pro-memorandum/anti-memorandum opposition, or the 
pro-/anti-Europe one (in the discourse of pro-austerity parties). This observation raises a 
question about whether such interchangeability might conceal interesting complexities and 
nuance. After all, it is perfectly straightforward to imagine anti-memorandum advocates 
opposed to the specific memorandum proposals, but still broadly in favour of austerity 
measures.12  
 
Viewing discourse in terms of a practice of articulation means treating the relationship 
between discursive elements as non-necessary. This trains our attention on the ‘articulatory 
links’ being made between such key elements as ‘austerity’, ‘nationalism’, as well as 
different actors and groups from across the political spectrum. However, although there is no 
necessary relation between these elements, it is worth noting that there is an obvious 
asymmetry in the Greek case: all want to portray themselves as patriotic, whatever their 
position is on the memorandum, austerity, or the mainstream ‘establishment’. 
 
Moving now to the second key feature of our approach, we argue that a turn to the 
psychoanalytic categories of fantasy and mourning can contribute analytically and critically 
to an account of the polarised and volatile character of Greek crisis discourse. The 
significance of psychoanalysis for a theory of ideology, the category of fantasy in particular, 
has been highlighted by many scholars, often in the pages of this journal.13 We do not 
propose to rehearse these arguments here. Suffice to say that the fantasmatic – and 
ideological – dimension of political discourse is understood to be linked to those aspects of a 
narrative to which subjects become overinvested as a way of coming to terms with an 
ultimately precarious and unstable existence. This is the significance of fantasy in relation to 
articulation: the fantasmatic narrative conceals the non-necessary character of articulation. 
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As to the category of fantasy, this can be understood in terms of its content: ‘its ideals, the 
obstacles to achieving such ideals, the way challenges can be overcome, the vision of a 
successful outcome, and the imagined consequences of failure’.14 And this means that 
different fantasmatic narratives promote, support and justify different normative visions and 
render different sets of norms and practices possible.  However, apart from the normative 
dimension evident at the level of content, fantasy incorporates an ideological dimension 
linked to the subject’s mode of attachment to this content.15 The specificity of fantasy 
compared to other forms of discursive formation is that it serves also as a device to protect 
the subject from anxiety. This anxiety is associated with the contingency of social relations, 
which the subject seeks to avoid through affective investments in imaginary and symbolic 
guarantees underpinning the norms of a practice (figures, objects, ideals, etc.). The 
ideological dimension of fantasy is thus linked to the role it often plays in pre-empting the 
contestation of norms, in this case austerity or anti-austerity norms, and possible detachment 
from them. It follows that the task of the ‘critique of ideology’ is an ethical task precisely 
because it constitutes an attempt to render these attachments visible despite the anxiety such a 
process might provoke. 
 
This distinction between the ethical and the ideological dimensions of fantasy is captured in a 
range of ways in psychoanalytic theory.16 There are already a range of concepts invoked in 
relation to the Greek economic crisis that could be said to point to an affinity with this 
perspective, including ‘de-pathologization’, ‘avoiding idealisation’, and ‘de-exoticization’,17 
resisting ‘press stereotyping’,18 ‘moral narrativisation’19 and ‘the culturalization’ of the 
crisis.20 Here, however, we place mourning and blocked mourning at the centre of our 
interpretive frame, using this to organize popular expressions and affective investments in 
nationalist narrative responses to the economic crisis in Greece.21 What makes this 
vocabulary appropriate to a crisis situation is that mourning (and blocked mourning) 
describes not simply a response to an experience of loss; crucially, it also describes the 
process of exploring loss. It is about exploring what the experience of loss says about what 
exactly is lost and the manner in which we can engage in such a process of exploration. 
When viewed in this way, we can understand the many expressions of dislocation as so many 
expressions of loss, actual and potential: loss of employment, loss of financial security, loss 
of socio-economic prosperity, loss of a ‘growth’ economy, loss of national sovereignty, loss 
of hope, loss of a particular self-image and identity, loss of national pride, loss of dignity. But 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, what we feel is lost is often something in which we are 
fantasmatically invested. This experience of loss is crucial, since different ways of 
discovering, constructing, and coping with loss can reveal or conceal possibilities of 
transformation.22 Following Lacan, we could say that mourning, as an ethical response, 
would signal a transformation in modality from ‘desire for recognition’ (characterised by 
containing and reifying loss) to ‘recognition of desire’ (characterised by opening up loss to a 
process of exploration). Recourse to loss and mourning thus offers us a way to critically 
understand the affective reactions to the economic crisis, austerity in particular. 
 
 
Research Strategy & Methodology 
In what follows, we demonstrate the way the economic crisis, and the austerity/anti-austerity 
responses more specifically, have been articulated in a strikingly nationalist-patriotic manner, 
paying close attention to its genealogical origins in the mainstream governmental and media 
discourses. Looked at more closely, however, we find two distinct ‘articulatory pathways’ 
animating the responses to the crisis – the melancholic and ressentiment pathways – both of 
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which can be understood in terms of ‘blocked mourning’, but which are distributed unevenly 
across the political spectrum. By training our focus on the question of loss, we discover a 
romantic fantasmatic trait that appears to underlie both pathways, and we claim that a critique 
of ideology (‘crossing the fantasy’) can proceed by revealing and opening up to 
transformation this common feature. 
 
In making this argument we draw on a corpus that covers the period from 2010 to 2013, 
comprising discourses derived largely from government and newspaper sources, but we also 
make reference to the discourse of the left party SYRIZA during this period in order to 
demonstrate how the discourse of patriotism became rather totalising in its scope and reach 
across Greece’s political landscape. Methodologically, we focus on six key periods in which 
Parliament was voting on austerity measures, or in which national elections were taking 
place. These are: the vote on the first Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and 
the Troika (7 May 2010), the vote on the mid-term plan of 2011 (29 June 2011), the vote on 
the second Memorandum (12 February 2012), the vote on the multi-bill of 2012 (7 November 
2012), the votes on the two multi-bills of 2013 (28 April 2013 and 17 July 2013), as well as 
the two national elections of 2012 (6 May and 17 June).23 The newspapers from which we 
collected material were the four newspapers with the highest circulation at the beginning of 
the crisis, representing key positions from the left to the right of the political spectrum. In 
order of circulation (starting from the highest), these are: Ta Nea (centre, traditionally 
associated with PASOK), Kathimerini (centre right, traditionally associated with the Nea 
Demokratia party), Ethnos (centre), and Eleftherotypia (left-wing – at times associated with 
the left-wing section of PASOK). To this selection we also added Avgi (left wing, associated 
with SYRIZA). While Kathimerini and Ta Nea expressed clear overall support for the 
austerity agenda, Eleftherotypia and Avgi expressed overall condemnation. Commentaries in 
Ethnos were more mixed: some strongly condemned the austerity measures, and some, while 
opposing them, also saw them as unavoidable. We read the newspaper editions of the week 
before the vote and also on the day of the vote, to see how these newspapers framed the 
austerity reforms being voted on. We drew on Prime Ministers’ speeches too. Sections of the 
latter were reproduced in the media, but we were also able to examine them in their entirety, 
as they were uploaded on the official webpage of the Prime Minister of Greece.24 
 
Our newspaper databases comprised all political commentary columns of the aforementioned 
newspapers. The texts were then subjected to qualitative interpretation involving deep 
immersion in, and reflection on, the corpus in order to gain a settled picture of the content 
and tenor of the narratives produced during the austerity/anti-austerity discussions and 
debates. The vast majority of the extracts we use to support our interpretations come from 
these databases, but we supplement them occasionally with quotations from texts derived 
from government sources and from newspapers printed outside this period, particularly when 
they are better able to capture the storylines identified in our original database. 
 
In interpreting this material, it is important to keep in mind that Greece had three different 
pro-austerity governments during this period: (a) the social-democratic PASOK government 
with Georgios Papandreou serving as the Prime Minister (2009-11); (b) the government led 
by technocrat Lucas Papademos and supported by PASOK, the conservative Nea 
Demokratia, and the extreme right LA.O.S. (2011-12); (c) the government led by Antonis 
Samaras and supported by Nea Demokratia, PASOK, and, for a certain period, DIMAR 
(2012-2014). In terms of the broader political context, the Communist Party, the main 
traditional left-wing force that had secured third place in most elections since the early 1980s, 
lost considerable support: since the 2012 elections, Golden Dawn, a previously marginal neo-
	 6 
Nazi party, gained support to secure third place (a position they have maintained since). 
Within the space of a few short years, SYRIZA, a small left-wing anti-austerity party gained 
popularity during the crisis period and eventually became the main party in government 
following the national elections of 2015 (sharing power with the ultra-conservative right-
wing anti-austerity party ANEL). 
 
 
Nationalism as an all-encompassing horizon 
It is worth pointing out at the outset that much academic work identifies the rise of nationalist 
discourse during the period under investigation exclusively with anti-austerity responses to 
the crisis;25 and this echoes earlier arguments that link nationalism with the ‘political 
extremes’ in Greece.26 There is, of course, a fully justified and well-documented academic 
interest in the rise of the far right in response to the Greek economic crisis.27 Such analyses of 
nationalist rhetoric, however, often miss the intense mobilisation of patriotic discourse by the 
‘moderate’ centre, in other words, the pro-austerity governments of the crisis period. 
 
The proliferation of references to nationalist themes in official pronouncements and 
mainstream media is something that have recently been explored by discourse-analytical 
approaches, some operating on a micro level,28 and some on a macro level.29  These works 
demonstrate how national identity and memory was politicised and became an important part 
of the conflicting discourses in the context of the crisis. Our current research supports these 
findings, and attempts to explain the emergence of this kind of conflict, pointing to the 
dynamics that can account for its force.  
 
In what follows we draw on our empirical material to show how the nationalist inflection was 
articulated by the moderate centre of the Greek political establishment. This is important not 
just because it offers a more nuanced alternative to the usual identification of nationalist 
rhetoric with the extreme right, but also because it helps us better appreciate the ‘centre’s’ 
genealogical role in politicizing national identity themes vis-a-vis the economic crisis and the 
austerity agenda. In fact, the political centre defined early on the terrain of debate in terms of 
patriotism. The nationalist-patriotic narrative came to undergird not just the austerity position 
of the centre, but also the anti-austerity positions of the right and the left, including SYRIZA. 
This was a significant shift in Greek political discourse and the discourse of the Left in 
particular, especially if one takes into account the historical association of Greek nationalist 
discourse with the right and its role in supporting the persecution of and violence against the 
left for almost half of the 20th century.30 
 
However, the genealogical role of the moderate pro-austerity government and press can be 
understood not only as a way of underlining how the nationalist framing process is more 
complicated than has often appeared in previous discussions that associate nationalism almost 
exclusively with anti-austerity discourse. Its genealogical significance can also be appreciated 
by noting how the nationalist frame was not the only (or necessary) frame with which to 
inflect the austerity/anti-austerity discussion and debate in the first place. Other frames were 
possible and were more visibly present in earlier stages of the crisis: economic-technocratic 
frames were possible, as were neoclassical or Keynesian ones, which were largely subsumed 
by the pro-/anti-memorandum frame. The real possibility of alternative framings can also be 
appreciated through a comparative exercise, by looking at the shape of the austerity/anti-
austerity debate in other countries. Comparisons with Spain and Ireland have shown that the 
implementation of austerity reforms in these two countries did not result in a nationalist 
inflection of political discourse to the same degree.31 And comparisons with Portugal have 
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shown that dissatisfaction expressed in that country was locatable almost exclusively on the 
left-right economic axis, and mostly projected towards the EU, while in Greece it was also 
expressed on a left-right cultural axis and directed towards the national political system.32 
 
Turning again more directly to the case of the Greek economic crisis, the role of the moderate 
centre in propagating the rhetoric and narrative cannot be overstated. From George 
Papandreou’s ‘road back to Ithaca’ speech of 2010, through the speeches of Lucas 
Papademos’s tenure, to even sharper expressions in the political discourse of Antonis 
Samaras, all three pro-memorandum governments of the period used this patriotic frame 
forcefully to inflect the austerity response to the crisis.  
 
It was in the discourse of the Prime Minister George Papandreou that the theme and signifier 
‘patriotism’ appeared for the first time in an attempt to present the crisis as an evil that can 
only be defeated by a united Greece. In using the term ‘patriotic duty’ Papandreou 
transformed it into one of the main signifiers in the discourse of the pro-austerity camp. 
Traces of this logic can be found in his announcement that the Greek state would resort to the 
European Financial Stability Facility mechanism to help ‘Greece get back on its feet and 
make Greeks feel proud’. He described this decision as the beginning of a new ‘Odyssey for 
Hellenism’. Famously, Odysseus lost his way on his return home to Ithaca following the 
Trojan War. Papandreou, however, asserts that 
 
this time we know our way back to Ithaca and we have charted the waters…  [W]ith a 
new collective consciousness and common effort we will get there safely, more 
certain, more just and proud. Our final goal, our final destination, is to liberate Greece 
from surveillance and patronage, to liberate the forces of Hellenism, to liberate every 
Greek man and woman from beliefs, practices and systems that have been obstructing 
him in everything for decades. […] Our inspiration, our belief, lies in this very 
country […], this wonderful people….33 
 
Despite the sobriquet ‘technocrat’ applied to the leader of the subsequent coalition 
government, Lucas Papademos also drew extensively from the patriotic repertoire in 
attempting to persuade people of the necessity of austerity measures, and we shall refer to 
some relevant extracts later in the paper. For now, we focus on the discourse of Antonis 
Samaras two years on, where we find even stronger nationalist references. We find him 
invoking a temporal narrative in which a glorious past has been interrupted by the crisis. This 
crisis and the sacrifices we are called on to make through the proposed austerity measures are 
presented as a temporary phase that we have to endure in order to reach a ‘loopy’ future that 
involves returning to a trajectory which belongs simultaneously to Greece’s past and future 
destiny, identified with Hellenic glory. Samaras’s vision is thus a ‘restorative vision’ that 
seeks to restore continuity with an earlier era of economic prosperity, over-determined by the 
glory of an even earlier Hellenic past. This was evident in Nea Demokratia’s campaigns for 
the elections of May and June 2012 and was heightened in Samara’s discourse as Prime 
Minister. One of the most characteristic examples of an articulatory practice that reinforced 
this inmixing of economic and nationalist elements is a series of videos screened on 
television and  on Nea Demokratia’s YouTube channel, titled ‘The Strength of a Nation’, 
where Samaras expresses a desire to: 
 
unite the forces of all Greeks. I have suggested a plan, but also a vision… Above all, I 
ask you to believe in yourselves, in Greece’s wealth, in the inexhaustible source 
residing in every Greek. The plan we are suggesting can lead the country to 
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tomorrow. The vision we are suggesting can unite Greeks. And when Greeks unite 
and acquire faith in themselves they can do wonders.34 
 
A few seconds later, we find Samaras screaming: ‘Give me the strength of a nation so that we 
can win the battle of our fatherland’, while images appear depicting famous Greek 
monuments and historical figures, reinforcing a powerful national narrative that stretches 
from antiquity to the present: Aristotle, Maria Callas, heroes of Greek Independence, 
Pericles, Alexander the Great, Hagia Sofia in Istanbul (symbol of the Byzantine period and 
Greek irredentism), the Olympic torch relay ceremony in Olympia. In the last shot Samaras 
himself appears as the next step in this compelling trajectory, thereby also standing as 
candidate-instrument of this ineluctable historical unfolding. Another video presents similar 
images of sacred monuments and figures described as ‘looking through your [the voter’s] 
eyes’, hoping not to be let down. Samaras explains: ‘[w]hen things become difficult, a people 
have to look back to the past. And when they can see such a great history, they can look 
ahead with courage and determination… I have deep faith in Greek strength,[…] in the 
Greek’s love for the fatherland… Give me the strength of a nation, to show the whole world 
what Greece means, what dignity means, what a strong soul means’.35 These sentiments and 
narratives also informed much of Samaras’s public speeches in asking for support for the 
continuation of the austerity agenda. 
 
We have focused primarily on the pro-austerity ‘moderate’ centre so far because its discourse 
has served to define the terrain of debate, subsequently taken up and reinforced by a range of 
other actors, particularly on the right of the political spectrum. There is, however, an equally 
potent nationalism to be found in the anti-austerity messages uttered by groups on the left, 
including SYRIZA. In fact, SYRIZA spokespersons did not in the end hesitate to adopt 
nationalist rhetoric, often identifying their political opponents as unpatriotic traitors. For 
example, SYRIZA MP and (and later minister), Dimitris Stratoulis, opposed the multi-bill of 
November 2011, stating that ‘not even the […] Nazi collaborators ever dared to introduce 
such measures with respect to labour relations’. The leader of SYRIZA, Tsipras himself, 
often presented the pro-austerity governments as puppet governments, construing them as 
agents spearheading an invasion of Greece. In his words, the dilemma of the 2014 elections 
was not ‘Samaras or Tsipras’, but ‘Greece or Merkel’.36 
 
 
Symptomatic patterns of Blocked Mourning: When talk of the cause of loss short-
circuits talk about loss  
 
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear…37 
 
The totalising character of nationalist rhetoric during the Greek crisis period, as demonstrated 
above, is certainly striking. But it is important to note that this unity of rhetoric belies 
important differences of emphasis that can help us better understand the force underpinning 
the austerity and anti-austerity discourses. Looked at more closely through a 
psychoanalytically-informed interpretive frame that foregrounds the idea of loss, we can 
discern in the nationalist narrative two distinct modes of subjectivity at play: melancholia and 
ressentiment. We argue that both modalities comprise pathways of ‘blocked mourning’ 
because they serve to quickly define or contain loss in a way that closes down the process of 
discovery and deliberation about loss and thus the possibility of seriously contemplating 
alternative social and economic visions. Moreover, as we will see, the two pathways are 
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distributed unevenly across the poles of the austerity/anti-austerity opposition. While the 
nationalist-melancholic path appears to be articulated in a way that almost exclusively 
supports the austerity position, the path of ressentiment can be readily found in the rhetoric of 
both austerity and anti-austerity advocates. 
 
The Melancholic Way 
The austerity governments pre-empted the process of discovery and deliberation about loss 
first through the quasi-melancholic rhetoric of self-blame. In his psychoanalytic reading of 
the European justifications of austerity, Stavrakakis has noted ‘a process of creating and 
sustaining shame and guilt and thus legitimising punishment (in the form of radical 
impoverishment, sky-rocketing unemployment, liquidation of labour and other social 
rights)’.38 But similar strategies of justification were put at the service of the austerity reforms 
within Greece. In provoking affective responses of self-reproach and moral culpability, such 
strategies promote acceptance of the austerity measures, presenting the reforms as fair ‘self-
punishment’.  In the words of Theodoros Pangalos, then deputy prime minister, responding to 
protesters outside parliament in 2010, ‘[w]e all gorged on it [the money] together’.39 This 
way, Greeks themselves are cast as responsible for the loss of prosperity and they should thus 
atone for their own errors by accepting austerity as due punishment.  
 
In a crucial speech addressed to Parliament before the vote on an important aspect of the 
austerity/bailout package, George Papandreou amplified this sentiment by insisting that what 
has to be opposed is not the austerity measures, but our resistance to moral catharsis, locating 
the cause of the current predicament in ourselves: ‘The enemy is within us, the barbarian is 
inside the walls’. We need to engage in a ‘battle against ourselves’: ‘[W]ho is the real 
enemy? Who spins the spider web that keeps us dependent?’ For Papandreou the answer is 
we ourselves: ‘our parasitical economy’ that depends on foreign products instead of 
producing Greek ones, relying on subsidies and allowances from the EU that give no 
incentive to improve a poor and inefficient education system; our dysfunctional welfare state 
that feeds dependence and our clientelist state which fosters an anti-meritocratic climate that 
promotes easy ‘jobs in the public sector’. Addressing the MPs, Papandreou stated: ‘[A]ll of 
us here should carry the burden of our responsibility and support the [bailout] agreement’. 
Why do all MPs have this ‘historical responsibility’? Because, all political forces have 
contributed to the situation that the country is facing today: ‘It is our fault either because we 
did it, because we tolerated it, or because we closed our eyes to it. Yes, it is our fault. Every 
appointment that we did as a favour, every loophole that we created, every privilege that we 
legislated, every union that we defended, every unreasonable demand that we helped to 
realise, every fake promise that we gave, every trade unionist that we nurtured and who then 
misunderstood his role’. ‘Our fatherland demands from us that we move beyond ourselves’.40 
Guilt and shame is thus produced and applied liberally across the entire political spectrum 
and population. Within such a morally-inflected narrative opponents to austerity are not 
honestly owning up to the irresponsibility of their past. Although initially this call to affirm 
and accept responsibility and austerity was accompanied by a promise of hope and the 
exploration of new ways of putting Greeks on the path of progress (a return to Ithaca), the 
new waves of austerity measures quickly shifted away from this open and potentially more 
positive vision toward justifications pitched in the shrill tones of TINA (there-is-no-
alternative).41 
 
Mainstream Greek media quickly picked up this theme, fostering and reinforcing a 
melancholic climate of guilt and shame. It systematically promoted an affective discourse of 
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loss that strongly and simultaneously emphasised patriotism and self-blame, drawing on 
biological metaphors: 
 
We are a country that is experiencing the end of a period of prosperity that went hand 
in hand with a decline in leadership, values, and institutions. We forgot what ‘I love 
my fatherland’ means because we got entangled in a vicious circle pursuing 
indulgence, comfort, mindless bliss… We need to watch out not to ever allow this 
crisis to develop into some kind of national defeat… At this point, in the wake of our 
gene of self-destruction becoming dominant, one can only raise one’s hand and cross 
oneself, hoping to avoid the worst from happening….42 
 
This ‘gene of self-destruction’ appears as a metaphor for many things, particularly for those 
of a leftist ilk, and certainly as a warning against any opposition to austerity measures. But 
the theme of actual and potential loss through self-destruction was expressed in other ways. 
Some media commentators, for example, have identified the ‘oriental’ aspect of Greek 
identity as responsible for the crisis and for Greece’s resistance to full ‘Europeanization’: 
 
Greece may have acquired pro-European parties, but it did not acquire European 
parties. […] [I]t was governed by parties with European orientation … but through 
oriental practices. The institution of the clientalist state and of parasitism, the 
complete contempt for meritocracy, the political bazaars with selfish motives but 
cataclysmic consequences for the country, the medieval demands of guilds became 
the very identity of these parties and brought us to where we are today.43 
 
Beyond the statements found in Papandreou’s speeches and much mainstream media the 
discourse of guilt and moral catharsis would be taken up too by the government of technocrat 
Lucas Papademos, which argued that the loss of economic and social security should not be 
used as a way to avoid taking ‘responsibility’.44 On the contrary, as Sevastakis notes, 
‘sacrificial language is… summoned in order to provide legitimacy to very specific “rational 
reforms”’, establishing a ‘public morality of sacrifice’ that was to help usher in a neo-
conservative shift in the discourse of the elites.45 In the words of Papademos: ‘We will not 
get out of the crisis without sacrifices. We are a proud and duteous [philotimos] people. We 
know what struggles mean. And this today is the struggle for our fatherland’.46 This discourse 
thereby demands personal sacrifices for the sake of national survival, understood in 
traditional, almost romantic terms: ‘we are [not in the custody of the troika, but] in the 
custody of History’.47 
 
The Way of Ressentiment 
The above account illustrates the melancholic way of containing loss. In this view, Greek 
economic woes are understood in relatively short order to be the product of moral corruption, 
for which sacrificial moral catharsis is the solution. Self-blame is invoked to stoke up the 
kind of guilt and shame that can serve as emotional support for calls to self-punishment, 
thereby tightening the ideological grip of the austerity measures. In this melancholic context 
loss cannot be processed in a way that can give rise to alternative visions of a national-
economic ilk. This is because talk about the cause of loss (moral corruption) has short-
circuited discussion and deliberation about the character of this loss: about the content of this 
loss, about what this loss means to us, and about what it could mean to us. 
 
But there is another prominent way in which loss is contained. Instead of attributing the cause 
of (temporary) loss to our decadent, morally depraved selves, we attribute it instead to others; 
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and there are a variety of figures that appear to occupy this position. If melancholic self-
blame was about individual and complicit guilt, and the acceptance of austerity as deserved 
self-punishment, ressentiment renders specific groups other than ourselves responsible for 
loss and its consequences. Here we suggest that the tendency to affectively invest in 
scapegoat figures as a way of containing loss can be critically approached through the 
Nietzschean concept of ressentiment. Ressentiment could be read from a psychoanalytic point 
of view as a particular mode of organising enjoyment. Fantasies of victimhood and revenge, 
for example, often appear in the mode of ‘theft of enjoyment’,48 wherein our enjoyment is 
experienced as ‘stolen’ by others. Such a reading is not entirely at odds with Nietzsche’s 
formulation, and indeed appears to stress a dimension already implicit in his own work, for 
example, when he observes how subjects gripped by ressentiment ‘enjoy being mistrustful 
and dwelling on nasty deeds and imaginary slights’, or tend to blame others for their 
suffering: 
 
[E]very sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an agent; 
still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering – in short, some 
living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or 
in effigy.49 
 
Ressentiment can thus be understood as another pathway of ‘blocked mourning’ that signals a 
type of response to, or containment of, loss. For William Connolly, ressentiment is associated 
with a refusal to acknowledge that we are attached to fantasies of omnipotence and fullness, 
so that when these fail to materialise, we are more than ready to project the cause of this 
failure onto others: ‘those who resent the fragility of their own fundamentals are apt to blame 
some other group or doctrine for this obdurate condition’.50 In that sense, ressentiment should 
be distinguished from resentment, although the two can be linked. No doubt ‘[i]t is unlikely 
that a new social movement could unfold without its potential members feeling resentment 
toward key elements in the status quo’.51 Resentment may thus be understood as a necessary 
condition for politics, for the contestation of norms and practices, and the production of 
political frontiers. Ressentiment, though, is different, in the sense that it functions at an 
existential level. While resentment produces political opponents, ressentiment produces 
existential threats and enemies.  It is, indeed, possible that accumulated and disregarded 
social resentments may slide into ressentiment:  
 
Politics underscores the extent to which as mortals we are always, already subject to 
painful limits and losses. Indeed, the fact that in the political domain individuals and 
collectives can suffer irreparable harms illustrates how political conditions and events 
directly tap into fundamental insecurities and reinforce the sense of impotence that 
underpins ontological ressentiment.52 
 
At this point it is worth highlighting that, unlike the case of melancholia which was dominant 
in the government’s pro-austerity political discourse and mainstream media, the ethos of 
ressentiment has cut across the entire political spectrum, finding itself expressed in both pro- 
and anti-austerity responses to the crisis in and outside the ‘establishment’.  
 
Since, as we will explain shortly, the conditions for mourning were absent, the eruption of 
ressentiment was not unexpected as a prominent alternative to the melancholic containment 
of loss. Take the grassroots mobilisations of Aganaktismenoi (2011), for example. Although 
these mobilisations were characterised by demands for more democracy, and for attentiveness 
to popular grievances, sections of the movements also exhibited features of ressentiment, 
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demanding violent revenge that targeted the political and media establishment as a whole. As 
Theodossopoulos’s anthropological analysis has showed, anti-austerity protests showed a 
great degree of ambivalence, resisting austerity measures, but largely in ways that reinforced 
the hegemony of nationalist discourses.53 
 
Even left-wing media discourse appeared split between trying to present and defend 
alternative ways of confronting the crisis on the one hand, and resorting to nationalist 
blaming on the other. Eleftherotypia’s cartoons often depicted German politicians as Nazis, 
and the pro-austerity Greek governments as Nazi collaborators, a heavily charged figure from 
the times of the Nazi occupation of Greece. Some SYRIZA representatives also resorted to 
similar sorts of comparisons and to national otherings.54 Alexis Tsipras, in an attack against 
the coalition government led by Papademos, said: ‘[S]ome Greeks are not so Greek after all. 
Those who govern us’.55 A few months later, before the 2012 national elections, he 
emphasised that PASOK and New Democracy ‘looted Greece and then they lowered the flag 
and handed it to Merkel’.56  Although by no means characteristic of the majority of its 
commentators, similar language also started featuring in SYRIZA’s newspaper Avgi around 
the same time. This was also expressed in Avgi’s political cartoons. For example, Papademos 
was depicted crushing ancient Greek statues under a machine press, while supporters of the 
memorandum were presented as equivalent to Nazi collaborators and supporters of the 1967-
1974 dictatorship.57 
 
Pro-austerity governments, in turn, accused the anti-austerity opposition for being anti-
patriotic and anti-Greek. This rhetoric reached its peak during the Samaras tenure after it 
became evident that SYRIZA’s popularity was increasing rapidly. In a revival of old right-
wing anti-communist discourse, Samaras claimed that the left ‘would not mind seeing Greece 
getting destroyed’, and that those who do not have faith in the results promised by austerity 
are basically ‘undermining the country’, discouraging foreigners from investing in Greece, 
and contributing actively to the production of unemployment.  
 
I do not know if they [SYRIZA] dislike this country. Sometimes I think that they might 
even hate this country! ... They want to deprive Greeks of what? Of the Hope that is 
coming. They want them to be what? They want them to be desperate and on their knees. 
We insist on wanting them standing upright and proud!58 
 
But ressentiment extends beyond the exchange of accusatory insults between political parties. 
On certain occasions, pro-austerity governments constructed specific social groups as culprits 
for economic hardships.  For example, public workers have been portrayed as responsible for 
the recession, particularly the injuries inflicted on the private sector: the closure of businesses 
and the subsequent loss of jobs, as well as the massive collapse of the low-middle class. As 
PASOK MP and health Minister, Andreas Loverdos, succinctly put it, ‘1 million [public 
sector] workers harass 10 million citizens’.59 Weak and marginalised social groups, like 
immigrants, also became a target in this strategy. Amid severe cuts in health care, Loverdos 
had also depicted immigrant women sex workers as the culprits for the alleged increase in the 
spread of certain diseases, contaminating the nation. As he said, ‘the infection passes from 
the undocumented migrant women to the Greek male customer, into the Greek family’.60 The 
pro-austerity camp can thus be understood as attempting to deflect indignation away from the 
austerity agenda, redirecting the affects of loss onto others. A characteristic example of such 
redirection of anger through scapegoating is Minister of Finance Evangelos Venizelos’s 
response to the accusations of delaying the investigation of a list of Greeks suspected of 
smuggling large amounts of untaxed money to banks outside Greece. When it became known 
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that there was such a list and that the government had not taken the expected investigative 
steps, but had instead tried to bury the case, this became the cause of angry reactions accusing 
the government of concealing corruption. When Venizelos was asked if he could remember 
any names from the list, he said that he could only remember that the names at the top of the 
list were Jewish.61 Samaras was even more persistent in the targeting of immigrants, blaming 
them for welfare state insufficiencies, like the lack of nurseries: ‘nursery schools are full of 
immigrants and there are no places left for Greeks in kindergartens’.62 The cause of 
unemployment—one of the most severe consequences of austerity according to many 
commentators —was also attributed to immigrants by means of spurious correlations: ‘We 
have as many illegal immigrants as we have unemployed’.63 The Minister of the Protection of 
the Citizen argued that immigration is the big threat to the nation, not the economic crisis, 
promising harsher measures targeting immigrants: 
 
The country is perishing. Since the Dorian Invasion 4,000 years ago the country has 
not experienced a large-scale invasion like the one today. […] It constitutes a bomb 
exploding the foundations of our society and state. […] A solution to [the problem of] 
migration is a great national challenge. We are about to collapse. […] We are facing 
the danger of complete social erosion. Migration may be a problem greater than the 
economic one.64 
 
In closing this section we should note how other actors beyond mainstream governments and 
media also sought to capitalise on the popular resentments and frustrations in similar ways. 
The most extreme example of nationalist ressentiment comes, of course, from the Neo-Nazi 
Golden Dawn, a party whose aggressive rhetoric has found support among a sizeable part of 
the electorate due to its promises to exact revenge not only against the mainstream political 
and media establishment but also against immigrants.65 
 
 
Ideology as Blocked Mourning: When the Conditions of Mourning are Unmet 
In adopting and applying loss as an analytical grid to the empirical material within a broad 
discourse theoretical framework, we have pointed not simply to the significant role that the 
content of a patriotic frame plays in constituting/shaping the character of the austerity/anti-
austerity debate. We have also drawn attention to the subject’s mode of attachment to this 
content through distinct processes of ‘blocked mourning’. Our findings receive some 
independent empirical support from the work of Lialiouti and Bithymitris, who demonstrate 
that the pro- and anti-Memorandum camps have mobilised national identity in distinct 
ways.66 They argue that while the pro-memorandum camp often deploys a ‘self-blaming’ 
interpretive scheme, where Greece is responsible for its economic failures, the anti-
memorandum camp is more likely to resort to variants of a ‘victimisation’ scheme, where 
Greeks are threatened by an external enemy. While these theses share a deep affinity with our 
own findings, the theoretical-analytical grid we bring to bear on the material gives these 
findings a very particular twist. It suggests that these two pathways are symptomatic of 
something linked to loss. The rush to blame a morally-depraved self or to blame threatening 
others serves as a way to avoid talk about loss. A swift move to reify the cause of loss 
deflects attention away from an exploration of loss itself. Our approach suggests that 
focussing on loss and mourning prompts a series of more pointed questions, leading us for 
one to be more specific about what exactly the objects of loss are or can be, and therefore to 
be more precise about the fantasmatic stakes of the nationalist narrative. 
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As we have noted in earlier parts of this paper, affectively invested elements linked to loss 
can serve as pointers to the fantasmatic stakes of nationalist narratives, and arguably the most 
potent and affectively invested expression of loss has been made in terms of pride and 
dignity.  This is evident in the quotes we have cited above, where the restoration of pride is 
presented as one of the promises of the implementation of austerity. But this is a theme that 
also featured strongly in Alexis Tsipras’s opposition to austerity. The peak of the reference to 
dignity was reached in his announcement of the referendum of July 2015 in the Greek 
Parliament, where the restoration of dignity was repeatedly highlighted as what was at 
stake.67 
 
From a psychoanalytic point of view we can say that affectively potent reactions are typically 
revealed when the subject’s unconscious fantasy is exposed and threatened in moments of 
dislocation. Imaginary and symbolic supports wobble and the subject glimpses the anxiety-
provoking radical contingency visible just below the surface of fantasy. However, since these 
supports are to a great extent unconscious, what has been lost is not directly or immediately 
apprehensible.68 Therefore the subject needs to go through the difficult process of 
recognizing, and actually constructing this lost object, ascertaining its significance, and 
eventually withdrawing affective investment from it in order to consider re-investing 
elsewhere. This is the process of mourning. 
 
However, it is not at all self-evident that a dislocatory experience will be followed by 
mourning. It is important to emphasize that mourning is a very demanding task, since it 
requires from the subject to admit that a part of its security is gone. Furthermore, since the 
loss and its object(s) are not directly accessible, but have to be articulated as such, mourning 
is also an open-ended process with no single possible outcome that can be pre-determined.69 
Thus, it puts subjects in a state of ambivalence, something noted in anthropological accounts 
of how individuals have coped with the loss of security during the crisis.70 Our point here is 
that mourning is only one of several ways to cope with loss; in fact it is more likely that we 
will cope with loss in other ways that seek to preserve the fantasmatic investment with which 
we are familiar. Hence the idea of ‘blocked mourning’. In contrast, mourning establishes a 
different, less invested relation to the fantasmatic supports of our identifications, making 
evident in this way the ethical significance of mourning and its conditions of possibility.71 In 
the case of the Greek economic crisis, mourning could signal the loosening of an over-
invested affective attachment to a particular (national) fantasy. 
 
Given the prominence attributed to the loss of pride and dignity in public political discourse, 
perhaps we can qualify it as a ‘master’ loss, overdetermining the many other losses expressed 
in the media and in the streets. In this view any one of a series of concrete losses (loss of 
income, security, way of life, economic growth, hope), become highly charged or invested 
insofar as they come to embody a (threatened) loss of pride and dignity. But what fantasmatic 
narrative underlies this potential loss of pride and dignity? 
 
Perhaps one of the strongest fantasmatic narratives of the political discourse on the crisis has 
to do with the threatened collapse of a potent national self-image built around the inextricable 
link between Greek identity and Europe as an ideal. As scholars of Greek nationalism like 
Stathis Gourgouris have demonstrated, this sense of identity is fundamental and is based on 
modern Europe’s discovery of its own origins in ancient Greece.72 This does not simply 
constitute a beatific image, but also a normative ideal that needs to be performed and 
satisfied.73 De-orientalising, modernising, and catching up with the West, have been justified 
in modern Greek history in terms of fulfilling Greek destiny as the cradle of Europe and 
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Western civilisation more generally. Politically, this image has served to normalise the 
modernisation thesis, furnishing it with ideological support. In an earlier echo of this idea in 
1977, then Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis countered those questioning his support 
of Greece’s accession to the EU by simply claiming that: ‘We belong to the West’.74 
 
The importance of the figure of the West for Greece as a normative ideal has been 
emphasised not only in different accounts of Greek national identity, but also in academic 
accounts of Greek political culture. An influential exposition of this idea can be found in 
Diamandouros’s theory of ‘cultural dualism’ in Greek society and politics.75 In this view, 
there are two political cultures in Greece, a modernising one and the ‘underdog’ one, where 
the latter is associated with virtually all pathological aspects of Greek society and politics 
(populism, corruption, clientelism, backwardness, etc.) that work as obstacles to 
modernisation. The modernisation project of Prime Minister Costas Simitis (i.e. ‘Powerful 
Greece’), was supported along such lines, and Simitis himself made use of the scheme of the 
‘two Greeces’, where one Greece is pro-western and progressive, while the other is populist 
and resists all attempts at modernisation and associated reforms.76 In fact the ‘cultural 
dualism’ thesis has recently made a return and has been re-assessed as a way of explaining 
the current Greek economic crisis along these lines.77 Similar schemes of a split culture in 
terms of good and bad have been mobilised in pro-austerity journalistic accounts.78 
 
But this idea of Greece as the cradle of Western civilisation has been prominent in much of 
pro-austerity discourse, often expressed in terms of an intense anxiety – a reaction to a 
threatened loss of this self-image. Here, loss appears to be loss of the Western gaze that 
supports national sovereignty and pride, a loss we must at all costs prevent. In the words of 
Lucas Papademos, leader of the technocratic coalition government, 
 
[w]e Greeks will not carelessly lose… [our] most treasured… acquisition, our 
position in Europe. […]Greece, the cradle of ancient political Europe is [an] integral 
participant of this common path towards closer European integration. Greece is 
Europe and Europe is unthinkable without Greece.79 
 
We speculate that this fantasmatic self-image is a powerful and potent one, underlying not 
just the melancholic pathway but also the pathway of ressentiment. Crucially, in the crisis 
period this self-image was mobilised to pre-empt the contestation of the austerity doctrine 
with reference to the figure of Europe. One of the most characteristic responses to the 
doubters of austerity involved tarnishing them with an anti-European brush, thereby blurring 
the boundary between pro-European and pro-austerity positions. This became very clear in 
the case of the 2015 referendum (introduced by the SYRIZA-led government) where the pro-
austerity parties sought to present the choice in terms of staying or leaving the EU. But even 
in the period under our examination, the figure of Europe is presented in a charged fashion in 
the two high-circulation pro-austerity newspapers—in Kathimerini more than in Ta Nea— 
often in ironic tones that signal the immanent and imminent threat of reappearing 
orientalising and balkanising tendencies: 
 
Maybe now that we messed up as Europeans […] we could start preparing for our 
accession to the United Arab Emirates.80 
 
[T]he dilemma we have to answer is whether we eventually want to be a modern and 
European state or an isolated Balkan country.81 
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What is interesting is that several themes in the anti-austerity discourse can be seen as 
attempts to disrupt the aforementioned narrative and related narratives of guilt and failure, 
often reflecting anthropological observations of the way individual Greek subjects react to 
them.82 No doubt some of the anti-austerity interventions show signs of ressentiment (Greece 
being betrayed by the West, the depiction of EU and German officials as Nazis, shame for 
belonging to a submissive nation, desire for isolationism). Others, however, appeared more 
reflexive and nuanced, showing that opposition to austerity can take the form of an 
attachment to Europe. Such responses could politicise and also pluralise accounts of both 
Greece and Europe. Attempts to discredit these alternative expressions potentially limited the 
spectrum of possible non-resentful responses to austerity. 
 
What this hints at, however, is that certain conditions have to be met for a (mournful) 
detachment from  such a potent self-images and identity to take place successfully; and in the 
absence of these conditions we can talk about ‘blocked mourning’.83 For example, we can say 
that there must at least be some form of public recognition of potential loss. Containment or 
denial of loss, rather than the symbolic construction and affirmation of the loss of a self-
image, is clearly not conducive to the mourning process. 
 
Take the case of melancholia. As we saw earlier, the way nationalist fantasies were mobilised 
to sustain the austerity policy solution make the proper processing of loss virtually 
impossible, so that a basic precondition for mourning is absent. Instead, Greeks are said to 
have an urgent duty to accept austerity in order to prevent the loss of national continuity and 
historical identity; and so the failure to fulfil the demands of austerity is understood to be a 
failure to discharge one’s patriotic duty. This prohibits the formation of a judgement of loss, 
since such a judgement of loss would necessarily involve acknowledging some form of 
discontinuity and the emergence of a potentially alternative trajectory. 
 
Consider, for example, the attempts to reduce or manipulate images of suffering that emerged 
early on as part of this tendency to contain loss in the name of national pride. Such 
concealment stifles a crucial aspect of mourning (i.e., the public display of concrete losses), 
which prevents the emergence of bonds of solidarity and the expansion of collective 
identifications on the grounds of collective suffering.84 In this view, public mourning 
involves exposing vulnerability as a fundamental feature of the human condition, thus 
enabling the formation of a ‘we’ based on the realisation that all life is precarious and fragile.  
 
Indeed, Makis Voridis, Nea Demokratia spokesman, asserted that it was media images 
depicting wretchedness that were responsible for creating a ‘climate of depression’ and for 
the rise of suicide rates, not the government’s austerity programme.85 Although some 
criticized Voridis’s claims, many media outlets expressed support for this position. When the 
Guardian picked as its ‘picture of the day’ the shot of an Athenian crowd accepting food 
provided by farmers, Babis Papadimitriou, director of Skai TV, fiercely criticised the choice 
of the British newspaper during the main news broadcast of his TV station: ‘The Guardian 
has been deploying anti-Greek propaganda that serves their own political goals… [The 
producers] obviously chose to distribute fruit in such a poor neighbourhood in order to 
humiliate their country […]’.86 Again, our claim is that the more such images are censored, 
the more difficult it becomes not only to contest the austerity agenda (insofar as such 
wretchedness and pauperisation is understood to be a product of such an agenda), but also to 




These efforts at prohibiting or censoring a publicly shared recognition of loss are rather 
extreme and certainly not always successful. But it is worth noting that the simple public 
recognition of loss is not of itself sufficient for the process of mourning to unfold either. An 
appropriate context must also be in place and actively sustained for mourning to take its 
course, and in the absence of such a context ‘blocked mourning’ is still a likely outcome. 
Since the proper processing of loss is co-extensive with our confrontation with the 
contingency of social existence (since our fantasy and identity are at stake), and since the 
‘grip’ of ideology is linked to our fantasmatic investment in economic and nationalist 
narratives, we claim that the identification of the unmet conditions of mourning can 
contribute to the task of ideological critique. 
 
For example, we could say that severe restrictions of space and time suppressed the 
emergence of a context that could foster a mourning process. Consider the familiar role of the 
‘emergency situation’ in political life from 2010 onwards. As an illustration of how this type 
of restriction blocks mourning, Judith Butler quotes George Bush declaring, only 10 days 
after 9/11: ‘We have finished grieving […] now is time for resolute action to take the place of 
grief’.87 In the case of the Greek crisis, much of the austerity reforms and policies from 2010 
to 2014 were prescribed by the Troika, the pro-austerity governments, and the media, as 
‘shock doctrine’ medicine, declaring that only the ‘resolute’ and ‘immediate’ implementation 
of the austerity/bail-out plan would work. Even parliamentary deliberation was seen as a 
dangerous delay that needs to be prevented for the country’s own good: 
 
The bill is urgent for reasons that are nationally existential…. [Otherwise] the country 
will not manage to stand on its feet – it will become bankrupt…. We are ‘writing’ the 
country’s fate now…. Enough with the games! This is about the country’s future!88 
 
Emergency deadlines were introduced for virtually all parliamentary votes on the 
austerity/bail-out agreements, making impossible not only democratic deliberation, but even 
the simple reading of the agreements, often comprising more pages than one could possibly 
read in the allotted time. Former PASOK Minister Michalis Chrysochoidies publicly 
confessed that he voted for the Memorandum without reading it at all. Justifying his actions, 
he said ‘it took place under conditions of panic in view of the [nightmare] scenario of 
cessation of payments that was haunting us. We had our back against the wall’.89 MPs were 
put under severe pressure from their parties to toe the line on pain of expulsion, with critics 
painted as irresponsible actors wilfully putting the country at risk. 
 
As recent academic work has argued, the TINA (there-is-no-alternative) dogma has been one 
of the most widely used strategies of the pro-austerity camp,90 and much of the press has 
played a crucial role in reproducing this.91 In fact, out of the five newspapers we examined, 
the two with the highest circulation by far –Ta Nea and Kathimerini – expressed support for 
the proposed austerity measures, often arguing that even the mere contemplation of 
alternatives would result in a national disaster. Attempts to delegitimise the economic 
strategies of the Left (particularly SYRIZA) by presenting them as harbingers of ‘collective 
suicide’ are a clear case in point.92 
 
Since the media comprise important agents that can affect the function of the public sphere, 
we can understand that, under such conditions, strong media business actors can play a 
crucial role in shaping our understanding of the crisis, promoting specific ways of framing 
and disregarding alternatives. Such a context, characterised by pressures and severe 
imbalances regarding the public visibility of different accounts and visions, means that the 
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spatial and temporal conditions for mourning remained unmet. This is the case when 
grassroots collective economic projects, including health initiatives, time banks, co-ops and 
worker-controlled factories — understood as alternative responses to the effects of austerity 
— rarely received media attention.93 No doubt this has to do with the intense pressures and 
the climate of emergency through which the austerity reforms were introduced in Greece. 
These pressures certainly derive—at least partly—from a (neoliberal) pro-austerity hegemony 
on a global level but also on a European level, certainly since 2008.94 But the political 
discourse articulated by pro-austerity Greek governments, and supported by the strongest 
mainstream media, also played an essential role in the spread of these pressures. Such 
pressures did not simply offer substantive support for the TINA doctrine but they also served 
to block the mourning process, thereby contributing to the polarisation and instability of the 
Greek political order over this period. 
 
Looking at this more closely we can discern how the large established newspapers (but also 
television stations) played a role in obstructing the conditions of mourning, something that 
can be explained by the political economy of the media in Greece and beyond, including the 
traditional relations between media owners and the PASOK and New Democracy 
governments of the last decades.95 It is well-documented that media owners come from the 
strongest sectors of the Greek economy, such as construction and shipping, whose companies 
have, for many years, been competing for, and winning, big state contracts.96 Indeed, the 
relations between the media and the state have been described in terms of patronage and 
clientelism. In this view, traditional political parties adopt favourable policies towards the 
media and the businesses of their owners, receiving favourable reporting in exchange.97 
Austerity made these practices less affordable, but some remained or were replaced with new 
protections of media monopolies.98 Overall, then, the critique of ideology in this case cannot 
avoid appealing to analyses of the political economy landscape in Greece, including the 
rather tight interdependence among the traditional political establishment and the media.  
 
 
Conclusion: Mourning and Ideological Critique 
In completing the argument of our paper, the previous section focussed on the conditions that 
have made mourning difficult, thereby helping to tighten the ideological grip of the 
nationalist narrative underpinning the austerity and anti-austerity responses to the crisis. 
Ultimately the nationalist narratives thematise potent fantasies presenting visions about past 
glories and threats to that self-image, at least as it appears through the gaze of the West. 
Usually, the horrific aspects of these fantasies depict scenarios that threaten to undermine our 
attachment to these visions which then appear to need urgent and resolute defence. Repeated 
iteration and reinforcement of such fantasmatic scenarios militate against a more reflexive 
assessment and renegotiation taking root, especially as regards the links between Greece, 
Europe, and a neoliberalising austerity. From the point of view of ideological critique 
(‘crossing the fantasy’), the task would then involve identifying and meeting the conditions of 
mourning. This would entail opening up a space for collective judgements about loss to take 
place in a context of relative openness (as opposed to a threatening and dismissive 
atmosphere in emergency situations), enabling the fantasmatic contours of the implicit 
guarantors to be revealed through a process of construction and transformation. 
 
Insofar as these discursive and political-economic conditions remain unmet, however, they 
help account for the extreme polarisation and volatility of the Greek political order since 
2010. As we saw the austerity/anti-austerity debate very quickly became a polarised dispute 
over who was a true patriot, affecting the content and tenor of engagement across the political 
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spectrum, raising the stakes of the debate. The totalising character of the nationalist narrative 
was therefore a recipe for violent oscillations between pro and anti-establishment parties. We 
have suggested that the rigid polarisation was in part the product of the conditions of 
mourning remaining unmet. But of course the conditions of possibility of this polarised and 
volatile state of affairs furnish ideas about how things could proceed differently. 
 
Our theoretical argument has been that ideology can be understood in terms of whether and 
how we confront loss or dislocation – of an object, a self-image, an ideal, an identity, etc.  
The ‘grip’ of an ideology is thus a product of efforts to contain, rather than register and 
confront, loss; and this ‘blocked mourning’ can be expressed in a number of symptomatic 
ways, such as melancholia and ressentiment. From this point of view, a critique of ideology 
would aim to ‘unblock mourning’, thereby focussing our attention on the conditions under 
which mourning can take place. 
 
Key conditions of mourning involve enacting a publicly shared recognition of loss and 
ensuring there is an appropriate context within which to process this loss ethically and 
creatively, but these were compromised in the Greek case on account of the manner and style 
of the dominant response to the crisis performed and promoted by the government and the 
mainstream media (but not just by them). Registering and processing loss is ethically 
demanding because it entails affirming vulnerability and contingency and confronting anxiety 
in a context that valorizes a more muscular and decisive ethos. But it is demanding also 
because it entails engaging in a process of identifying and constructing fantasies that have 
made this particular configuration of loss possible, and thus potentially also re-articulating 
them in a different way. This process of re-articulation presupposes a different, less-invested, 
relation to fantasy and its ideals. It also entails finding a new language with which to respond 
to the crisis and to express identities in a way that avoids reinstating ossified self-images and 
ideals. Part of this process would involve extending an open invitation to a wide range of 
groups to engage collectively and deliberatively in forging a new way forward, both 
politically and culturally. The polarisation – expressed in nationalist and resentful terms – 
drew attention away from certain critical and innovative practices that could foster mourning, 
usually operating at a grassroots level.99 Mourning conditions thus overlap with 
counterhegemonic conditions, since making such voices more accessible would involve 
putting into question norms of a governance network that sustain and protect a powerful 
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